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Full view. Lorenzkirche Nurmburg U-Bahn 1 min. Car Hire See all Nuremberg car hire. Best nearby. Namaste Indisches Restaurant.
Restaurant Albrecht-Durer-Stube. Germanisches Nationalmuseum. Get to know the area. Cultural Tours City tour through Nuremberg with the Bimmelbahn 2 reviews.
Drive through the old town and through the unique history of Nuremberg. From the main market with the beautiful fountain past the Maxbrücke, the St Lorenz church, the Heilig-Geist-Spital and up to the Kaiserburg with its fortifications.
Everything is easy for you to admire from the train. You will also learn fun and interesting facts, old-fashioned and current, glamorous and possibly also cruel, romantic and temperamental about Nuremberg and its residents.
On this tour you will experience the highlights of several centuries in about 40 minutes and then you can explore the city on your own.
More info. Write a review. Traveller rating. Selected filters. At the start of , she was assigned to mine-laying duty in the Skagerrak , and was based in Oslo , Norway.
She completed only one mine-laying operation, Operation Titus , on 13 January. The forces assigned to the operation included two destroyers, two torpedo boats, and a mine-layer; Nürnberg herself carried mines.
Severe fuel shortages prevented any further operations. On 24 May, Nürnberg and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen sailed from Copenhagen under escort by Devonshire , Dido , and several other warships.
The flotilla arrived in Wilhelmshaven on 28 May, and the German vessels remained there while their fates were determined at the Potsdam Conference.
The Allies eventually decided to award Nürnberg to the Soviet Union. To prevent the Germans from scuttling their ships as they had done in , the Allies formally seized the vessels on 19 December, while Nürnberg was in drydock.
That day, the ship's Soviet crew came aboard. On 2 January, the Soviets took their seized warships, which also included the target ship Hessen , Hessen' s radio-control vessel Blitz , the destroyer Z15 Erich Steinbrinck , and the torpedo boats T33 and T , to Libau in present-day Latvia.
The Soviet Navy examined the ship in great detail after she arrived in Libau. The cruiser was then renamed Admiral Makarov and assigned to the 8th Fleet , based in Tallinn.
In late , she became the flagship of the 8th Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral F. In the early s, three new Chapayev -class cruisers entered service, which prompted the Soviet Navy to withdraw Admiral Makarov from front line duties.
She returned to her old job as a training cruiser, this time based in Kronstadt in mid During this period, most of her light anti-aircraft armament was removed, and new radars were installed.
Her ultimate fate is unclear; she appears to have been placed out of service by May , and was scrapped some time thereafter, reportedly by mid Nevertheless, she was the longest-surviving major warship of the Kriegsmarine, and the only one to see active service after the end of the war.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Main article: Leipzig-class cruiser. Gardiner, Robert; Chesneau, Roger, eds.
Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, — Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. Gröner, Erich German Warships: — I: Major Surface Vessels.
Prien, Jochen Eutin, Germany: Struve-Druck. Rohwer, Jürgen Weal, John Admiral Makarov. Jump to: navigation , search. Cruiser U.
Tier VI. Main Battery. Rotation Speed 7. Firing Range HE Shell mm Spr. HE Shell Weight AP Shell mm P. AP Shell Weight Secondary Armament 1.
Firing Range 4. HE Shell 88 mm Spr. Torpedo Tubes. Rate of Fire 0. AA Defense. Average Damage per Second Firing Range 3. Firing Range 2. Rudder Shift Time 7.
Surface Detectability Range Air Detectability Range 5. Secondary Gun Turrets pcs. Acutely sensitive to international opinion and relations with the United States , the death of more than a hundred civilians was damaging.
Dönitz suppressed the truth that the ship was sunk by a German submarine. He accepted the commander's explanation that he genuinely believed the ship was armed.
Dönitz ordered the engagement to be struck from the submarine's logbook. Dönitz did not admit the cover up until Hitler's original orders to wage war only in accordance with the Prize Regulations , were not issued in any altruistic spirit but in the belief hostilities with the Western Allies would be brief.
On 23 September , Hitler, on the recommendation of Admiral Raeder, approved that all merchant ships making use of their wireless on being stopped by U-boats should be sunk or captured.
This German order marked a considerable step towards unrestricted warfare. Four days later enforcement of Prize Regulations in the North Sea was withdrawn; and on 2 October complete freedom was given to attack darkened ships encountered off the British and French coasts.
Practically the only restrictions now placed on U-boats concerned attacks on passenger liners and, on 17 November, they too were allowed to be attacked without warning if clearly identifiable as hostile.
Although the phrase was not used, by November the BdU was practicing unrestricted submarine warfare. Neutral shipping was warned by the Germans against entering the zone which, by American neutrality legislation, was forbidden to American shipping, and against steaming without lights, zigzagging or taking any defensive precautions.
The complete practice of unrestricted warfare was not enforced for fear of antagonising neutral powers, particularly the Americans. Admirals Raeder and Dönitz and the German Naval Staff had always wished and intended to introduce unrestricted warfare as rapidly as Hitler could be persuaded to accept the possible consequences.
Dönitz and Raeder accepted the death of the Z Plan upon the outbreak of war. The U-boat programme would be the only portion of it to survive Both men lobbied Hitler to increase the planned production of submarines to at least 29 per month.
Göring would not acquiesce and in March Raeder was forced to drop the figure from 29 to 25, but even that plan proved illusory.
In the first half of , two boats were delivered, increased to six in the final half of the year. In the deliveries increased to 13 to June, and then 20 to December.
It was not until late the number of vessels began to increase quickly. The impressive tonnage sunk had little impact on the Allied war effort at that point.
For the first part of the war, despite disagreements with Raeder where best to deploy his men, Dönitz was given considerable operational freedom for his junior rank.
From September—December U-boats sank ships for , gross tons, at the cost of nine U-Boats. A number of his submarines were lost en route to the Atlantic, through either the North Sea and heavily defended English Channel.
Torpedo failures plagued commanders during convoy attacks. Along with successes against single ships, Dönitz authorised the abandonment of pack attacks in the autumn.
Dönitz wrote in May , "I doubt whether men have ever had to rely on such a useless weapon. Dönitz was encouraged in operations against warships by the sinking of aircraft carrier Courageous.
On 28 September he said, "it is not true Britain possesses the means to eliminate the U-boat menace. Full credit must also be given to Lieutenant Prien for the nerve and determination with which he put Dönitz's plan into execution.
The first six months in cost Dönitz 15 U-Boats. The Allied evacuations from western Europe and Scandinavia in June attracted Allied warships in large numbers, leaving many of the Atlantic convoys travelling through the Western Approaches unprotected.
From June , the German submarines began to exact a heavy toll. Germany's defeat of Norway gave the U-boats new bases much nearer to their main area of operations off the Western Approaches.
The U-boats operated in groups or 'wolf packs' which were coordinated by radio from land. This extended the range of Type VIIs.
The admiral remained sceptical of Operation Sea Lion , a planned invasion and expected a long war.
Dönitz gained importance as the prospect of a quick victory faded. Dönitz remarked they lacked the necessary toughness and discipline and consequently were "of no great assistance to us in the Atlantic.
The establishment of German bases on the French Atlantic coast allowed for the prospect of aerial support. Small numbers of German aircraft, such as the long-range Focke-Wulf Fw , sank a large number of ships in the Atlantic in the last quarter of In the long term, Göring proved an insurmountable problem in effecting cooperation between the navy and the Luftwaffe.
Göring succeeded in overturning this decision and both Dönitz and Raeder were forced to settle for a specialist maritime air command under Luftwaffe control.
The U-boat fleet's successes in and early were spearheaded by a small number of highly trained and experienced pre-war commanders. Although skilled and with impeccable judgement, the shipping lanes they descended upon were poorly defended.
Within the space of several days in March , Prien and Schepke were dead and Kretschmer was a prisoner. All of them fell in battle with a convoy system.
Six fewer existed in May than in September In January there were just six on station in the Atlantic—the lowest during the war, while still suffering from unreliable torpedoes.
Dönitz insisted that operations continue while "the smallest prospect of hits" remained. For his part, Dönitz was involved in the daily operations of his boats and all the major operational level decisions.
His assistant, Eberhard Godt , was left to manage daily operations as the war continued. Dönitz neglected nothing that would make the bond firmer.
Often there would be a distribution of medals or awards. As an ex-submariner, Dönitz did not like to contemplate the thought of a man who had done well heading out to sea, perhaps never to return, without being rewarded or receiving recognition.
Dönitz acknowledged where decorations were concerned there was no red tape and that awards were "psychologically important.
Intelligence played an important role in the Battle of the Atlantic. At the height of the battle in mid some 2, signals were sent from the U-Boats at sea.
The Germans did not suspect the Allies had identified the codes broken by B-Dienst. The Germans were never as open to new ideas or thinking of war in intelligence terms.
According to one analyst BdU "lacked imagination and intellectual daring" in the naval war. Just 10 transports were sunk in November and December On 7 May , the Royal Navy captured the German Arctic meteorological vessel München and took its Enigma machine intact, this allowed the Royal Navy to decode U-boat radio communications in June The papers were the only stores destroyed by the crew.
Beginning in August , Bletchley Park operatives could decrypt signals between Dönitz and his U-boats at sea without any restriction.
Even so, the U-boats achieved their best success against the convoys in March , due to an increase in U-boat numbers, and the protection of the shipping lines was in jeopardy.
Due to the cracked M4 and the use of radar, the Allies began to send air and surface reinforcements to convoys under threat.
The shipping lines were secured, which came as a great surprise to Dönitz. Signals security aroused Dönitz's suspicions during the war.
On 12 January German supply submarine U arrived nautical miles west of Freetown , well clear of convoy lanes. It was scheduled to rendezvous with an Italian submarine, until intercepted by a warship.
The German captain's report coincided with reports of a decrease in sightings and a period of tension between Dönitz and Raeder.
Despite several investigations, the conclusion of the BdU staff was that Engima was impenetrable. His signals officer responded to the U incident with answers ranging from coincidence, direction finding to Italian treachery.
He concluded that there was "convincing evidence" that, after an "exhaustive investigation" that the Allied codebreakers had been reading high level communications.
Dönitz intended to strike close to shore in American and Canadian waters and prevent the convoys—the most effective anti—U-boat system—from ever forming.
Dönitz was determined to take advantage of Canadian and American unpreparedness before the situation changed.
The problem inhibiting Dönitz's plan was a lack of boats. On paper he had , but in January , 99 were still undergoing sea trials and 59 were assigned to training flotillas, leaving only on war operations.
Therefore, on 1 January Dönitz had a fighting strength of 16—25 in the Atlantic six near to Iceland on "Norwegian operations" , three in the Arctic Ocean , three in the Mediterranean and three operating west of Gibraltar.
Unknown to him, ULTRA had read his Enigma signals and knew the position, size, and intentions of his boats, down to the date the operation was scheduled to begin.
The attacks, when they came, were not a surprise. Lawrence , a series of battles which lasted into The global average was The solitary kill was achieved by the RCAF.
Canadian operations, as with American efforts, were a failure during this year. Along with conventional U-boat operations Dönitz authorised clandestine activities in Canadian waters, including spying, mine-laying, and recovery of German prisoners of war as Dönitz wished to extract information from rescued submariners concerning Allied tactics.
All of these things tied down Canadian military power and imposed industrial, fiscal, and psychological costs. The impunity with which U-boats carried out these operations in Canadian waters into provided a propaganda effect.
Even with operational problems great success was achieved in American waters. From January to July , Dönitz's submarines were able to attack un-escorted ships off the United States' east coast and in the Caribbean Sea; U-boats sank more ships and tonnage than at any other time in the war.
After a convoy system was introduced to protect the shipping, Dönitz shifted his U-boats back to the North Atlantic.
By the time improved American air and naval defences had driven German submarines from American shores, 5, Allied sailors had been killed for negligible losses in U-Boats.
The ensuing Battle of the Caribbean resulted in immediate dividends for U-boats. In a short time, at least transports had been destroyed or sunk.
The sinkings damaged inter-island trade substantially. Oil refinery production in region declined  while the tanker fleet suffered losses of up to ten percent within twenty-four hours.
The USN introduced effective convoy systems thereafter, ending the "carnage. Dönitz maintained his demands for the concentration of all his crews in the Atlantic.
As the military situation in North Africa and on the Eastern Front began to deteriorate Hitler diverted a number of submarines to the Battle of the Mediterranean  upon the suggestions of Admiral Eberhard Weichold.
Hitler felt compelled to act against Allied sea forces which were having an enormous impact on Axis supply lines to North Africa.
The decision defied logic, for a victory in the Atlantic would end the war in the Mediterranean. Dönitz had met his end as a submarine commander in the Mediterranean two decades earlier.
In Dönitz summed up his philosophy in one simple paragraph; "The enemy's shipping constitutes one single, great entity. It is therefore immaterial where a ship is sunk.
Once it has been destroyed it has to be replaced by a new ship; and that's that. BdU intelligence concluded the Americans could produce 15,, tons of shipping in and —two million tons under actual production figures.
Dönitz always calculated the worst-case scenario using the highest figures of enemy production potential. Some , tons per month needed to be sunk to win the war.
The "second happy time" reached a peak in June , with , tons sunk, up from , in May, , in April and the highest since the , tons sunk in March Nevertheless, there was still cause for optimism.
B-Dienst had cracked the convoy ciphers and by July he could call upon boats, operational, to conduct a renewed assault. By October he had operational from Dönitz's force finally reached the desired number both he and Raeder had hoped for in The addition of a fourth rotor to the Enigma left radio detection the only way to gather intelligence on dispositions and intentions of the German naval forces.
German code breakers had their own success in the capture of the code book to Cipher Code Number 3 from a merchant ship.
It was a treble success for the BdU. Dönitz was content that he now had the naval power to extend U-boat operations to other areas aside the North Atlantic.
The Caribbean, Brazilian waters with the coast of West Africa designated operational theatres. Waters in the southern hemisphere to South Africa could also be attacked with the new Type IX submarine.
The strategy was sound and his tactical ideas were effective. The number of boats available allowed him to form Wolfpacks to comb convoy routes from east to west attacking one when found and pursuing it across the ocean.
The pack then refuelled from a U-boat tanker and worked from west to east. Raeder and the operations staff disputed the value in attacking convoys heading westward with empty cargo holds.
The tactics were successful but placed great strain on crews who spent up to eight days in constant action. November was a new high in the Atlantic.
The same month Dönitz suffered strategic defeat. His submarines failed to prevent Operation Torch , even with of them operating in the Atlantic.
Dönitz considered it a major self-inflicted defeat.Historical Info. We told her it was fine Horrible Waitress and Mediocre Food at the cafe. We have today the weapon and a leadership that can face up to this enemy. On 1 SeptemberGolden Acres became a Fregattenkapitän commander and, inwas put in command of the cruiser Emdenthe ship on which cadets and midshipmen took a year-long world cruise as training. The staff spoke very good English and were very keen to tell us about Nuremburg. London: Frank Cass. The decision defied logic, for Admiral Nürnberg victory in the Atlantic would end the war in the Mediterranean. They were supplied with between 1, and 1, rounds of ammunition, for between and shells per gun. Unknown to him, ULTRA had read his Enigma signals and knew the position, size, and intentions of his boats, down to the date the operation was scheduled to begin. Find out more on Wikipedia's Sister Darts Weltrangliste 2021. Charles H wrote Esportswall review Jun From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.